February 12, 2026 | 6 minute read

After years of expectation, the French authorities have finally delivered. The long-awaited third Multiannual Energy Programme (PPE 3) is officially underway, setting out France’s energy policy framework for the few years to come.

Overview of the French Climate and Energy Strategy: France’s energy and climate strategy is articulated through three main documents: the National Low-Carbon Strategy (SNBC) dated 12 December 2025, the Multiannual Energy Plan (PPE), and the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (PNACC). They aim to ensure a coherent approach to decarbonisation by aligning mitigation and adaptation efforts across all sectors. The SNBC sets the long-term decarbonisation trajectory, while the PPE translates these goals into concrete energy policy actions for the next decade. Both are based on a common reference scenario for 2030 and 2050 and aim to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

Focus on the PPE: Established by the Energy Transition for Green Growth Act of 17 August 2015, the PPE is France’s key instrument for implementing energy policy. It defines priority actions to help the country reach carbon neutrality by 2050. The PPE sets concrete targets for energy consumption and production, such as reducing demand and increasing renewable and nuclear capacity, over a ten-year horizon. Each plan spans two consecutive five-year periods; the third PPE covers 2025 to 2035 and, like its predecessors, will be reviewed midway, in 2030.

Closer Look at the PPE 3: The adopted PPE 3 outlines a revised decarbonisation trajectory compared to earlier drafts. It aims to increase the share of decarbonised energy in France’s final energy consumption from 42 percent in 2023 to 60 percent by 2030, reflecting a strengthened political commitment to reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The government considers the scenarios established and updated by RTE in December 2025 as part of its 2025 forecast report.

While the precise fossil fuel share for 2030 and 2035 remains to be confirmed in the decree’s annexes, the overall direction points to a significant contraction from the 58 percent recorded in 2023, driven primarily by electrification and the expansion of renewable heat networks (biogas, geothermal energy, district heating).

In parallel, the share of electricity in final energy consumption is expected to rise from 27 percent in 2023 to 34 percent by 2030, with a further increase anticipated by 2035 (around 39 percent, subject to confirmation). This reflects the government’s “reasonably optimistic” electrification scenario, despite currently stagnant electricity demand levels.

Renewable energy sources outside the power sector, including geothermal energy, biomass and renewable heat, are expected to play a complementary role in achieving the 60 percent decarbonised energy target, although detailed percentage breakdowns for 2030 and 2035 remain to be specified in the final decree.

Importantly, the objectives set out in PPE 3 are described as indicative and adaptable ceilings, allowing the government to reduce support volumes in case of overcapacity or insufficient demand growth. A mandatory review is expected by 2030, which may recalibrate the trajectory depending on economic conditions, electrification trends and system constraints.

This downward-only flexibility introduces uncertainty for investors and lenders, as it limits visibility on long-term support and may affect project planning and financing decisions.

Adoption Process: The adoption process has been significantly delayed due to political instability and ongoing debates. This delay is particularly problematic given the PPE’s crucial role in setting strategic targets and providing key guidance for the energy sector. Finalising the plan was essential, not only to offer much-needed visibility for stakeholders navigating the energy transition, but also to enable the launch of tenders supporting renewable energy and other sectors.

To make up for the delays, the government decided to implement PPE3 by decree. Yet, according to a strict reading of the Energy Code, particularly Article L100-1-A, such objectives should be set by law, with the decree serving only as an implementation tool.

The government, prioritising expediency, has chosen a faster route, notably because it does not hold a majority in the National Assembly. However, adopting the PPE by decree rather than through legislation primarily exposes the measure to litigation risk: it may be challenged before the Conseil d’État through an action for annulment.

Renewable Electricity Targets (2025-2030 / 2030-2035)

Solar PV

The PPE3 provides for a target of 48 GW of installed solar capacity by 2030, compared to approximately 31 GW at the end of 2025, and 55 to 80 GW by 2035. Notably, these targets constitute a material reduction compared to the earlier draft discussed throughout 2023-2024, signaling a recalibration of the government’s solar deployment trajectory. The 48 GW target corresponds to RTE’s “R3 rapid decarbonisation” scenario, which had been identified as a red line by the solar industry.

This represents an average annual deployment rate corresponding to 17 GW of additional capacity between 2025 and 2030 (i.e., approximately 3.4 GW per year). However, around 10 GW of projects are already considered ready-to-build, meaning that only about 7 GW would effectively need to be deployed over the five-year period.

This is a moderate slowdown compared to the 5 GW annual pace observed in 2024-2025, reflecting weaker electricity demand and growing price cannibalisation effects in the wholesale market, and represents a significant contraction compared to previous policy trajectories and is likely to result in a sharp slowdown in new project development. Such a reduction could have substantial consequences for the sector, including increased unemployment and material job losses across the solar value chain.

Onshore Wind

The PPE 3 sets a target of 35-40 GW of onshore wind capacity by 2035, compared to a previous objective of 45 GW.

Key features:

  • A downward revision of ambition compared to earlier drafts.
  • Clear prioritisation of repowering existing wind farms rather than large-scale greenfield expansion.
  • Continued sensitivity to local opposition.

While the impact may be less abrupt than in the solar segment, the reduced deployment trajectory and the shift toward repowering, which is typically less labor-intensive than new greenfield development, are nonetheless likely to weigh on job creation and could result in employment contraction across parts of the onshore wind value chain.

Offshore Wind (Including Floating Wind)

PPE 3 provides for:

  • 15 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2035, reduced from the previous 18 GW target.
  • Long-term ambition toward 2050 remains politically supported but will need confirmation in the decree annexes.

The reduction is described as a calendar shift rather than a structural reduction of ambition, with tenders 9 and 10 expected to be spread over time.

However, the economic equation remains fragile:

  • The AO7 public tender process for the Oléron project failed to attract any bidders and was declared unsuccessful in September 2025.
  • TotalEnergies is seeking a partner after RWE’s withdrawal from Centre Manche 2.
  • EDF is seeking renegotiation of the strike price for the Centre Manche 1 project.

Against this backdrop, the downward adjustment of near-term targets appears difficult to reconcile with France’s international positioning. France remains a signatory to the North Sea Energy Cooperation objective of reaching 300 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2050, a commitment that signals strong collective European ambition. A slower domestic deployment trajectory may therefore raise questions as to the consistency between France’s external commitments and its internal planning framework.

Nuclear Energy

The PPE 3 marks a clear pro-nuclear shift.

Nuclear production targets are increased to:

  • 380-420 TWh per year between 2030 and 2035, compared to the previous 360-400 TWh range.

This range now includes EDF’s internal management objective of 400 TWh.

Additional elements:

  • Full operational contribution of the Flamanville EPR is expected by 2030.
  • The PPE formally abandons the previous objective (PPE 2) of shutting down 14 reactors.
  • Lifetime extensions beyond 40 years remain central, subject to the French Nuclear Safety Authority’s approval.

Regarding new-build:

  • Six EPR2 reactors remain planned for a cost of around 73 billion euros.
  • Final investment decision depends on European Commission approval of the State aid scheme.
  • First commissioning is expected no earlier than 2038, meaning new EPR2 units will not contribute to 2035 targets.

Fossil Fuels Phase-down

The PPE 3 confirms:

  • Increase of decarbonised energy share from 42 percent (2023) to 60 percent by 2030.
  • Reduction of fossil fuels from 58 percent (2023) to ~40 percent by 2030.
  • Continued electrification as main decarbonisation driver.

France still imports approximately €60 billion per year in oil and gas, reinforcing sovereignty arguments.

Electrification of Demand

The PPE 3 is based on a “reasonably optimistic” electrification scenario despite stagnant demand since Covid.

Electricity share in final energy consumption is expected to rise:

  • From 27 percent (2023) to 34 percent by 2030.
  • And 39 percent by 2035.

Drivers include:

  • Electric vehicles;
  • Heat pumps;
  • Industrial electrification; and
  • Data centres.

The Way Forward

The government explicitly states that the objectives constitute indicative ceilings, allowing for downward adjustments in the event of overcapacity. This flexibility, while presented as a tool to prevent market imbalance, may generate regulatory uncertainty and reduce long-term visibility for investors and lenders. The possibility of revising targets downward during the implementation period could affect pipeline planning, financing structures and overall project bankability.

While the main political arbitrations now appear settled, several key elements are still awaited and will determine the operational impact of PPE 3.

  • The updated calendar of competitive tenders remains highly anticipated by market participants. The annual volumes, technology breakdown, and sequencing of calls for tenders (particularly for solar and offshore wind) will be critical to restoring visibility after months of uncertainty.
  • The government is expected to clarify its comprehensive electrification strategy, including sectoral road maps for transport, heating, industry, and digital infrastructure. The credibility of the generation targets will ultimately depend on the realism of projected electricity demand growth.
  • Finally, the conclusions of the mission entrusted to Thierry Tuot (Conseil d’État) and Jean-Bernard Lévy (former CEO of EDF) on the financial sustainability of public support for renewable energy are still pending. This report may significantly influence the design of future support schemes, the level of State exposure, and the balance between market risk and guaranteed remuneration.

In any event, it is reasonable to anticipate adjustments to PPE3 following the presidential elections in mid-2027.